"AN ANOMALY AMONG ANOMALIES"
INDIA'S ENTRY INTO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Karl J. Schinidt
Florida State University
On June 28, 1919,
Edwin S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and H. H. Ganga Singh, the
Maharaja of Bikaner, two of India's representatives at the Paris Peace
Conference, signed the Treaty of Versailles, and in doing so they not only helped
make peace with Germany but also entered India as a founding member of the
League of Nations.(1) India's entry marked a dramatic change in its external
status. As a non-sovereign colony of Great Britain, India's entry into the
League would seem to be an odd thing indeed--a great trick played on the other
countries represented at the Paris Peace Conference. It was not. Viewed in its
historical context, India's membership was the product of a sequence of
evolutionary events that began during the First World War and illustrated
changing constitutional relationships within the British Empire.
The origins of
India's membership in the League of Nations can be traced to a speech made by
David Lloyd George, Britain's Prime Minister, to the House of Commons in
December 1916. He proposed that an Imperial Conference, to be attended by
British Dominions representatives, be held to discuss the war effort and
further joint action. Sir Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for
India, claimed that India should also be represented at the Imperial
Conference; he cited India's large contributions of men and material to Great
Britain's war effort as the basis of that claim.(2)
For India, the
opening of the Imperial Conference and the Imperial War Cabinet in late March
1917 became important turning points in the development of its status within
the Empire. For the first time, India
was represented not only by its Secretary of State but also by three other
"assessors," two of whom were Indians. After several days of discussion at the Conference regarding the
need for a postwar "readjustment of the constitutional relations of the
component parts of the Empire," Canada's Prime Minister, Sir Robert
Borden, moved a resolution, which claimed that the Dominions were entitled as a
matter of right to consultation and participation in imperial foreign
policy. One of India's delegates, Sir
S. P. Sinha, stated that he supported the resolution but wished that it also
include India. The Dominions agreed,
and the resolution was accordingly altered and adopted. (3) Granting this concession not only helped
India, it also worked in the Dominions' favor.
Observing that the stated objective of the Government of India toward
self-government, the Dominions no doubt knew that, in their desire for greater
autonomy within the British Empire, they could count on the support of India in
the future.
In the fall of 1918,
with the military situation in Europe finally favoring the Allies, the British
War Cabinet began to discuss issues related to the conclusion of peace,
including the League of Nations and the impending Peace Conference.(4) The War Cabinet subsequently recalled the
Dominions and Indian representatives for consultation. Although India's representatives had been
invited to discuss the peace preparations in London, it was not yet assured
that they would actually be invited to attend the Peace Conference in Paris.
Meanwhile, British
parliamentary elections were to take place later that month, and, in light of
those impending elections, Lloyd George offered Montagu, the new Secretary of
State for India and a Liberal M. P., incentives to ensure his continuing
loyalties. Among these incentives were
promises to back Indian constitutional reforms and to allow representatives of
India to attend the Paris Peace Conference.(5)
When the Paris Peace
Conference officially convened on January 18, 1919, the question of the status
of the Dominions and India at the conference had not yet been settled. In early December 31, 1918, the Australian Prime
Minister, William H. Hughes, criticized the French scheme. He argued that, under the French proposals,
the Dominions would receive less representation than most of the smaller Allied
powers, despite the former's larger contributions to the war. The other Dominions representatives agreed
with Hughes. Sir Robert Borden, the
Canadian Prime Minister, felt that it would be "most unfortunate" if
the British delegation were to be comprised only of individuals from the
British Isles. He then suggested that a
panel system be devised whereby Dominion Prime Ministers could, on a rotational
basis, be selected to sit on a delegation "representing the whole Empire
at the Conference." Lloyd George
agreed in principle to Borden's proposal but calculated that if Britain, the
Dominions, and India were all fully represented at the plenary conference as
Borden had earlier suggested, the British Empire would be represented by a
total of twenty-three delegates.
"In attempting to gain so full a representation," he warned,
"we might run the risk of losing more than we gained." He agreed, however, to press the claims of
the Dominions and India at the next meeting of the Allied leaders.(6)
On January 12, 1919,
the Allied leaders met as the Council of Ten to discuss the procedure to be
adopted for the peace discussions. The Council agreed that each of the five
Great Powers should have five representatives each, but some disagreement over
the representation of other Powers ensued. Lloyd George suggested that the
Dominions and India should be properly represented at the Peace Conference and
that the best arrangement would be to reduce the smaller Allied Powers to two
representatives each and then to place the Dominions and India on the same
scale. The American president, Woodrow Wilson, agreed that two representatives
would be sufficient for countries like Belgium and Greece, but he wondered if
the Dominions and India could not be represented by "making the members of
the British Delegation interchangeable."
He feared that if the Dominions and India received separate
representation, the smaller Powers would see them merely as additional British
representatives and misinterpret this to mean that the Great Powers intended to
run the Peace Conference. Lloyd George retorted that the Great Powers had
"run the war" and bluntly stated that the Dominions and India had
sacrificed several hundreds of thousands of troops in battle--many more than
any of the smaller Powers--and that to refuse to accord them separate
representation would be resented.
Wilson was still worried about the psychological effect of so many
British Empire delegates, however, and, as a result, the negotiations over this
issue dragged on for two more days.(7)
Fearing an impasse,
later that week Wilson asked Lloyd George if he thought the Dominions and India
would be satisfied with the following arrangement: two representatives each for
Canada, Australia, and South Africa; one representative each for British India
and the Indian States; and one representative for New Zealand. Lloyd George agreed that this seemed fair,
and he said that he would inform the Dominions and India of the new
proposal. The Dominions accepted the
offer, but only grudgingly. India's
representatives, however, were pleased by the offer. In being accorded two representatives, India had again gained a
new status, taking "its place," as Montagu pointed out, "not
below the Dominions, but among them, above New Zealand and
Newfoundland." Once the question
of representation had been settled, the Dominions and India concentrated on the
business of helping make the peace. It
was clear that the Great Powers were going to dominate most of the
decision-making during the Peace Conference, but the Dominions and India each
had an interest in the final settlement, ranging from the disposition of
captured German colonies to the League of Nations.(8)
Organized interest
in securing Dominion and Indian representation in the yet-to-be-created League
of Nations predated the opening of the Paris Peace Conference, but all of the
discussions held in London prior to the opening of the Paris Conference were
more informative than deliberative and little of substance was
accomplished. When the British Empire
delegation arrived in Paris, the League idea had not evolved much beyond the
proposals contained in the Cecil Draft and the position of the Dominions and
India in the League was nebulous. The
wording of the Cecil Draft did not permit the admission of any of the
Dominions, and they claimed that to accept the document would be tantamount to
renouncing all of the gains the Dominions had made at the Peace Conference thus
far. Because the Cecil Draft was well
on its way to becoming the official British statement on the League, the danger
in complacency was that if the Dominions did not proclaim their dissatisfaction
with the document, they might be excluded from the League altogether. In a strongly-worded memorandum circulated
to the British Empire delegation, Borden criticized the Cecil Draft, and stated
that the claim to membership of the League of Nations "the people of
Canada will not forego. They would
certainly and most unequivocally repudiate any acquiescence on the part of
their representatives in its being ignored or denied."(9)
Meanwhile, as Borden
carried on his battle for the inclusion of the Dominions as separate members in
the League of Nations, Lord S. P. Sinha began his own fight for the inclusion
of India in the League. He quickly
prepared a memorandum for Montagu's use in which he argued that
If we look at the matter from the strict point of view of international
law, the position of India is in no way different from that of the
Dominions--not one of them is a Sovereign State, no one of them has "foreign
relations" independently of Great Britain and, according to the
existing constitution, each of them is bound by declaration of war or peace by
the parent State.
Sinha made several
additional arguments in favor of India's inclusion in the League of Nations,
among them that the Dominions and India had all been accorded the same right of
representation at the Peace Conference; if one or all of the Dominions gained
the right to join the League of Nations, he argued, then India should be
accorded that right as well. Sinha also
stated that the steady constitutional advance of India alongside the Dominions
had "given keen satisfaction in India and helped enormously to ease the
situation in that country." If the
British government intended now at this late juncture to differentiate between
India and the Dominions, Sinha declared, it would be
looked upon not only as a retrogression but a denial of privileges
granted under the stress of war but withdrawn as soon as the pressure was
removed. The political consequences of the exclusion of India would be
deplorable and would tend to undo much of the good effect recently
produced.(10)
Whereas Sinha had
made legal and constitutional arguments in favor of India's inclusion in the
League, his colleague on the Indian delegation, the Maharaja of Bikaner,
favored a more emotional appeal and asked,
After having borne arms, together with other civilized nations, in a
common cause while civilization and freedom hung in the balance and after
having actually entered the portals of the peace temple, which is in itself a
League of Nations, is India to be told to walk out as now no longer belonging
to the civilized nations of the world?(11)
During the first
week of February, the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference
began its work on drafting the Covenant of the League. At the Commission's third meeting, held on
February 5, the question of the wording of Article VI arose. Article VI dealt with the admission of
members to the League of Nations and, for India, proved a sticking point. Woodrow Wilson proposed to amend Article VI
by adding to the beginning of the second paragraph the phrase "Only
self-governing States shall be admitted to membership in the League; Colonies
enjoying full powers of self-government may be admitted. . . ."(12) This
amendment was obviously intended, at least in part, to accommodate the British
Dominions, but not India. Confronted
with the prospect that India might be excluded from the League and apparently
pledged by the Indian delegation to uphold their claims, Lord Cecil, a member
of the League Commission, pressed Wilson for a decision on India's admission to
the League of Nations. Mincing no
words, he asked:
Does the President propose to admit India, or does he oppose her
admission? It seems to me it should not
be forgotten that during the war India mobilized a million men. (. . .) It is true that part of India is
autocratically governed, yet it is willing to be so governed. And it cannot be
denied that the greater part of India is democratically administered.
In reply, Wilson
argued:
If we admit India, can we reject the Philippines? While we propose to grant the Filipinos
their political freedom at the earliest practicable date, at present they are
satisfied with their status, and I think it would be unwise to admit them to
the League. . . .(13)
Whatever merit
Cecil's arguments had, for Wilson and some of the other delegates on the
Commission, the heart of the issue was still self-government. Earlier, Wilson had confided to Col. Edward
House that he strongly objected to the inclusion of India in the League of
Nations, because it was not self-governing.(14) Wilson seemed unwilling to compromise on the issue of India, but
Jan Smuts, the South African defense minister, quietly offered him an
acceptable way out--one which would still preserve the President's stand on
principle. During the course of the
debate on the definition of "self-government," Smuts had astutely
observed "that India being one of the signatory Powers, would have
automatically a right to a delegate [in the League of Nations], therefore the
article would not apply to her, but to subject states or colonies that might
desire admittance to the League" in the future. In the end, Wilson finally relented and declared that he had no
objection to India's admission to the League.(15)
With Wilson's
assurances on record, Cecil believed that, in the future, no argument would be
made against India becoming an original signatory to the Covenant. Even if someone did make such an argument,
he told Bikaner, as a last resort the British Empire delegation could always
insist that India be included in the protocol.(16) Not content to let the matter rest there, Bikaner met with Cecil,
Lord Balfour, and finally with President Wilson, to affirm their personal
assurances in securing India's membership of the League of Nations.(17) Montagu was delighted that Bikaner had
spoken with the U.S. president, and reported to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy,
that the Maharaja had
covered himself with glory, gained the point, even hearing and
obtaining the necessary answer from the great President Wilson himself! (. .
.) The whole proceeding appears to have
concluded by Bikaner displaying to the Big Five the tiger tattooed on his arm,
which was inspected and approved not only by Clemenceau, but by Orlando and
Wilson. Thus we make peace with
Germany!(18)
Four months later,
when the treaty was presented to the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference on June 28, 1919, India
was expressly included as a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles and was named
in the Annex of the Covenant of the League of Nations as an original member.
From the perspective
of its critics, outside observers, and even supporters, India's entry into the
League of Nations seemed a curious affair.
How could India be admitted to an international organization, the
purpose of which was to regulate the behavior of sovereign states, when India
itself was a non-sovereign colony? The
answer lies in the pressures and rhetoric of the war, in the actions of a few
key individuals, and in dramatic changes in the structure of the British
Empire.
First, when the war
began, Indians overwhelmingly and enthusiastically supported Great
Britain. Even ardent nationalists like
Gandhi took an active part in the war effort.
While the British government gratefully accepted Indian support, it soon
became clear to them that some symbol of that gratitude had to be forthcoming,
or else further Indian support for the war might stop.
Second, Allied
rhetoric throughout the war was busy condemning the German government for its
autocracy, repression, and general lack of principles. It would have seemed hypocritical for the
British government, therefore, to stifle the desire of Indians for a say in the
affairs of the Empire even as thousands of Indian soldiers died on the
blood-soaked battlefields of northern France in the effort to help "make
the world safe for democracy."
That was the first step. The second
step, that of having a say in the affairs of the world, was a natural outgrowth
of the first.
Third, a number of
individuals played important roles in the advancement of India's external
status. Whatever his motives, Austen Chamberlain deserves some credit for
making the effort to obtain for Indians the right to help decide imperial policy. Montagu deserves even greater recognition
because of his genuine sincerity in advancing India's status both at the
Imperial Cabinet meetings of 1918 and at the Paris Peace Conference. Indeed, as later events would prove, Montagu
expended the better part of his political capital with Lloyd George by pressing
for India's claims. Some credit for the
advance of India's status should also go to Sir Robert Borden. Although he was primarily concerned with the
advancement of Canada's status within the Empire, his actions nonetheless made
it easier for India's advocates to press their claims. Finally, Lord S. P. Sinha and H. H. Ganga
Singh, the Maharaja of Bikaner, deserve recognition for their tireless efforts
in promoting and increasing India's status.
Their vigorous participation and politicking in the Imperial War Cabinet
and at the Paris Peace Conference demonstrated to the skeptical and arrogant
that Indians were fully capable of grappling with important issues logically,
thoughtfully, and intelligently.
Finally, during the
war, the Dominions increased their drive towards complete self-government, not
just internally, but externally as well. Canada, as the oldest Dominion, led
the way for the others in wresting from Great Britain that which it seemed reluctant
to share: power over the Empire. As
constitutional structures changed, so too did the status of the Dominions. This was most visible in external affairs,
where the Dominions charted an independent course, while remaining at the same
time within the orbit of the British Empire.
When the Dominions signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and became
members of the League of Nations, they became anomalies within the
international system. This anomalous
change in Dominion status also spilled over onto India, but because India was
non-sovereign, the changes within the Empire affected it in a slightly
different way. When India signed the
Versailles treaty and consequently became a member of the League of Nations, it
became in the words of David Hunter Miller, a U.S. legal expert at the Peace
Conference, "an anomaly among anomalies."(19)
Karl J. Schmidt, who received his MA degree in International
Affairs from Florida State University, is now a Ph.D. candidate in Modern South
Asian history at FSU with minor fields in Chinese history, Modern British
history, and U. S. history. He has been researching in Britain, India, and
Pakistan for his dissertation, "India's Role in the League of Nations,
19191939." He is the author of An Atlas of South Asian History
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe) which will be out in 1994.
ENDNOTES
1. 1. Versailles
Protocol No. 2, June 28, 1919, British Documents on Foreign Affairs
[hereafter cited as BDFA], ed. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt
(Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989). Part 2. Ser. 1, Vol.
8, Doc. 5, 14.
2. Minutes of 12th
Meeting of War Cabinet, Dec. 20, 1916, PRO, CAB 23/1 (microfilm).
3. Canada,
Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations
[hereafter cited as DCER] (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of
Stationary, 1967), Vol. 1, 308-12.
4. See Minutes of
481st and 496th Meeting of War Cabinet, Oct. 2 and Nov. 4, 1918, PRO, CAB 23/8
(microfilm).
5. Sir Algernon
Rumbold, Watershed in India: 1914-1922 (London: Athlone Press, 1979),
124; and Minutes of 41st Meeting of Imperial War Cabinet, Dec. 3, 1918, PRO,
CAB 23/8 (microfilm).
6. Minutes of 48th
meeting of Imperial War Cabinet, Dec_31, 1918, PRO, CAB 23/8 (microfilm). See
also Lord Derby's War Cabinet memorandum, GT 6568, PRO, CAB 24/72 (microfilm).
7. Minutes of
Meeting of Council of Ten, Jan. 12, 1919, BDFA, Part 2, Series 1., Vol.
1., Doc. 48, 300-03; Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ten, Jan. 13, 1919, BDFA,
Part 2, Ser. 1, Vol. 1, Doc. 50, 316-17.
8. British Empire
Delegation minutes, No. 2, Jan. 20, 1919, BDFA, Part 2, Ser. 1, Vol. 3,
Doc. 44, 332; Montagu to Chelmsford, Jan. 22, 1919, Edwin S. Montagu Papers,
British Library, Oriental and India Office Collection [hereafter cited as OIOCI],
MSS EUR D 523/3.
9. See Minutes of
1st and 2nd Meeting of Committee on Position of Dominions and India in League
of Nations, Jan. 1 and 3, 1919, DCER, Vol. 2, Docs. 22-23, 21-23;
Doherty to Borden, Jan. 22, 1919, DCER, Vol. 2, Doc. 36, 35; and Sir Robert
Borden, Memorandum on Draft Convention on League of Nations, enclosure to
Minister of Justice to Secretary, Committee On Position of Dominions and India
in League of Nations, Jan. 27, 1919, DCER, Vol. 2, Doc. 47, 43-44; Lord
Robert Cecil, Draft Convention on the League of Nations, Jan. 20, 19199 BDFA,
Part 2, Ser. 1, Vol. 4, Doc. 27, 161
10. Minute by Sinha
for S/S, Jan. 22, 1919, League of Nations files, Bundle E, File No. 6505,
Records of the Office of the Private Secretary to the Maharaja of Bikaner, Shri
Sadul Singhji Museum, Lallgarh Palace, Bikaner, Rajasthan, India [hereafter
cited as Lallgarh Palace Archives].
11. Memorandum by
Bikaner on India and the League of Nations, Feb. 2, 1919, ibid.
12. Minutes of 3rd
Meeting of League of Nations Commission, Feb. 5, 1919, Papers of Woodrow
Wilson [hereafter cited as PWM], ed. Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst,
et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), Vol. 54, 497.
13. Quoted in
Stephen Bonsal, Unfinished Business (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran
and Co., 1944), 46, 57.
14. The Intimate
Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1928). 311.
15. Bonsal, Unfinished
Business, 46.
16. Cecil to
Bikaner, Feb. 14, 1919, League of Nations files, Bundle E, file No. 6505,
Lallgarth Palace Archives..
17. Cypher telegram
from Bikaner to Montagu, Feb. 17, 1919, ibid.
18. Private letter
from Montagu to Chelmsford, Feb. 18, 1919, OIOC, MSS EUR D 523/3, 41
19. David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), Vol. 1, 493.