ZONE OF DESTINY:

GERMAN NAVAL OPERATIONS IN NORWAY

1942-1943

 

Stanley D. M. Carpenter

Florida State University

 

 

Off the North Cape of Norway at 7:45 pm on the evening of December 26, 1943, a powder magazine exploded.  Within seconds, the German pocket battleship Scharnhorst sank, taking with her all but thirty-six of the crew.  The disaster effectively ended German heavy surface ship operations in the Arctic Theater.  The strategy of employing large warships to interdict Allied merchant convoys carrying war materials to the Russian ports of Archangel and Murmansk ultimately cost Germany the bulk of its capital ship assets.  Appropriately, the final signal from Scharnhorst, sent at 6:24 pm, indicated that she would "fight to the last shell."(1)

 

        Allied convoys to the Soviet Union began in August 1941 and initially consisted of fast merchantmen, either lightly protected or sailing independently.  Until April 1942, hostile action destroyed only one ship.  That month heralded a change in the fortunes of the Allied Arctic mariners.  Despite the arrival of US Navy escort and capital ships, the next several months saw intensified German activity against the convoys.  Between April and June 1942, German air and submarine attacks resulted in the loss of twenty-three merchant vessels.(2)

 

        The German Naval Staff had come to feel that the destruction of Allied merchant shipping could be the basis for overall victory.  Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Navy Commander-in-Chief, argued that the destruction of the maximum amount of Allied seaborne tonnage would cripple or abort Allied offensive operations as well as reduce pressure on the Russian Front.  This "commerce war" (Handelskrieg) reflected Raeder's grand strategy which assigned three roles to surface warships.  As surface raiders, this strategy complemented the submarine campaign by attacking independently sailing merchants and lightly defended convoys on a "target of opportunity" basis.  Designed to draw off and destroy enemy assets to reduce British numerical superiority, surface warships conducted periodic sorties into the North Sea.  Pocket battleships (Panzerschiffe) and auxiliary cruisers deployed as commerce raiders in distant operational areas diverted Royal Navy assets from home waters.(3)  Using heavy surface ships to raid Arctic convoys supported of Raeder's grand strategy, the destruction of Allied seaborne commerce.

 

The loss of the battleship Bismarck in May 1941 demonstrated the unacceptably hazardous nature of North Atlantic operations.  However, the fiords of Norway provided nearby sanctuary to raiders which could reach a target within hours, deliver a devastating blow, and return to safe waters before the battleships and carrier aircraft of the Home Fleet responded.  Norway provided the vital element of land-based airpower for reconnaissance, patrol, and ship defense.  Hitler concurred with Raeder's strategy for the capital ships and stressed that attacks on the Arctic convoys had the highest priority.(4)

 

Both the Naval Staff and Hitler expected an imminent Allied invasion of Norway.  The December 1941 Naval Staff appraisal of the strategic situation in the Arctic Theater concluded that a series of British small actions heralded an Allied invasion, thus supporting the plan to transfer large surface combatants to the area.  The suspected British objectives, aimed at a larger follow-on "bridgehead operation," included the destruction of outposts and batteries, harassment and disruption of German merchant shipping, and terrain and defense intelligence gathering.(5)

 

The Naval Staff recommended that capital and support ships, centered around the battleship Tirpitz, be transferred to Norway.  The protection of the German position against invasion and the interdiction of convoys formed the primary objectives.  Threatening the Allies' northern flank forced the diversion of Allied assets which might otherwise be deployed to other theaters.  This "fleet-in-being" threat chronically troubled the British Admiralty and, in fact, did cause the diversion of significant Royal Navy assets to the Arctic Theater.(6)

 

Hitler believed Norway to be the "zone of destiny" and ordered the rapid reinforcement of all arms, particularly naval and air.(7)  The battleship Tirpitz sailed to Trondheim in January 1942 followed by the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer in February and the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Luetzow in March and May respectively.  Lighter destroyer forces accompanied the larger ships to provide anti-aircraft and anti-submarine protection.

 

Almost immediately the German plan to form an overwhelmingly powerful surface battle force encountered problems.  On February 23, a British submarine torpedoed the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen as she approached Trondheim, and a badly damaged rudder forced her to return to Germany for extensive repairs.  Despite the absence of the Prinz Eugen, the Naval Staff resolved to attack the next outbound (PQ) and returning (QP) convoys with the assembled surface forces.(8)  The Tirpitz and three destroyers sortied from Trondheim on March 6 in search of convoys PQ12 and QP8.  Sinking only a straggling Russian merchantman, the force returned after seven frustrating days.  The raiders actually passed "close astern" of PQ12 and just ahead  of QP8, but, owing to poor visibility and lack of effective radar, neither side realized its close proximity to the other.(9)

 

Reacting to the German raid, the Home Fleet covering force operating south of Jan Mayen Island, turned east to engage but could not bring the Germans to a surface action.  On the 9th, a strike force of twelve Albacore torpedo-bombers from the carrier H.M.S. Victorious engaged Tirpitz.  No torpedoes struck home, but machine gun fire from the aircraft wounded three officers on the bridge.  Fearing an encounter with superior enemy capital forces, the Germans fled for the refuge of Narvik.

 

The Naval Staff, and particularly Hitler, drew four conclusions from this initial operation.  First, carrier-based aircraft posed the "greatest menace" to the surface ships.  Next, Arctic Theater operations could not be conducted without land-based air support for reconnaissance, torpedo, and bomb attacks, particularly against enemy capital ships.  Third, any future operations required a concentration of forces which could not be committed until "the enemy's exact position and strength has been accurately and unequivocally ascertained by air reconnaissance."(10)  Finally, Hitler focused on the critical need for an aircraft carrier to support the surface battle groups.  Hitherto, the Navy had relied solely on land-based aircraft for operational support and long-range ocean reconnaissance as provided by the naval air arm (Seeluftwaffe).(11)

 

The German Naval Staff was finding it difficult to produce an aircraft carrier.  The Graf Zeppelin, laid down as the initial carrier in the late 1930s, could not be operational before summer 1943 due to a halt in construction at the outbreak of the war.  The development of a catapult mechanism and the necessary modifications to the JU87D bomber and BF109F fighter to make them carrier operable emerged as the thorniest problems.  A new type of carrier-based aircraft could not be in mass production before 1946.(12)

 

On March 14, Hitler ordered intensive attacks on the Arctic convoys.  He directed the Navy to concentrate U-boats in northern waters and the Luftwaffe to strengthen its high-level bomber and torpedo assets as well as its long-range maritime patrol and reconnaissance capability.  The joint service operational plan, based on the "lessons learned" from the first raid, called for the Luftwaffe to counter enemy carrier-based aircraft and to maintain a constant air assault on Murmansk.  Submarine forces assumed the roles of reporting convoy and covering force position and movement plus attacking "targets of opportunity."  Heavy surface units, supported by destroyers, took on two missions:  neutralizing both the Allied cruiser close covering force and the lighter close escort force consisting of destroyers, corvettes, and armed trawlers; and then sinking the unprotected merchantmen before enemy heavy units could arrive on the scene.  The Fuehrer directed that "it is necessary that maritime communications over the Arctic Ocean between the Anglo-Saxons and Russia, hitherto virtually unimpeded, should henceforth be impeded."(13)

 

Under the command of Admiral Otto Schniewind (Fleet C-in-C) at Trondheim, the First Battle Group (FBG) formed, consisting of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper, and the 5th and 6th Destroyer Flotillas.  At Narvik, the Second Battle Group (SBG) formed, consisting of Luetzow, Admiral Scheer, and the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.  On March 28, the first combined operation commenced and was directed against convoy PQ13.  Three destroyers engaged the light cruiser H.M.S. Trinidad on the 29th.  One of her own errant torpedoes struck and crippled Trinidad, but British gunnery sank an attacking destroyer.  The raiders destroyed only one Panamanian freighter.  Air and submarine forces eventually located the convoy and inflicted losses of 25 percent.  Attacks on PQ15 and QP11 followed at the end of April, resulting in the sinking of the light cruiser H.M.S. Edinburgh against the loss of a single destroyer.  Convoy PQ16 faced a running battle with German air and submarine forces from May 25 through June 1, 1942 and lost seven of thirty ships and 31,000 tons of cargo despite the heaviest escort to date and no surface attack.

 

To the Naval Staff, the strategy of surface interdiction combined with air and sub-surface assault seemed to be working.  German losses remained minimal and each new convoy suffered ever heavier damage, including damage to some escort warships.(14)  Significantly, during June, a minimum number of days where sea fog limits visibility combined with twenty-four hours of continual daylight allowed for around-the-clock aerial reconnaissance.  On the other hand, calm seas aided destroyer action, because good visibility and fair seas hampered a submarine's ability to approach and engage undetected.  Most importantly, the ice barrier had not yet far receded and placed any passing convoy at only 240 nautical miles from German naval and air bases on the North Cape.  From these northern bases, surface raiders could strike a convoy well before the Home Fleet covering force could interfere.  Given these good omens, Naval Group North issued an operational directive, "Knight's Move," for a combined arms attack on PQ17.(15)

 

Two overriding concerns influenced German actions in the PQ17 operation.  The surface raid could only be undertaken if reconnaissance clearly established that no chance existed of an engagement with superior Home Fleet forces.  Second, the threat from carrier aircraft to German surface forces, borne out by the Albacore attack on Tirpitz, concerned Hitler so deeply that he directed that the raid could only commence after the enemy carrier had been located and "rendered harmless" by Ju88 bomber attacks.  This restriction significantly hampered the subsequent deployment of the surface battle groups in "Knight's Move."  The operations order established the primary goal as the rapid destruction of the merchant ships with attacks on escorts conducted only as necessary to accomplish the mission.  The plan called for follow-up air and submarine action to deal with crippled ships.(16)

 

The operation employed both battle groups with FBG sailing north to Vestifiord and then to Altenfiord, while SBG headed directly to Altenfiord.  Upon transmission of the codeword from Naval Group North, all units would proceed out of Altenfiord at maximum speed to a rendezvous point, two hundred miles northeast of the North Cape.  All were to maintain high speed throughout the operation to counter enemy submarines.  For air cover, the Luftwaffe was to maintain reconnaissance sweeps at least five hours ahead of the track of the battle force in a two hundred-mile search arc.(17)  Once the battle force located the convoy, the destroyers were to engage the close escort to prevent torpedo attacks against the heavy units.  The Luftwaffe would deliver a massive bombing raid on PQ17 just prior to the surface attack.  Shadowing submarines, already on patrol to locate enemy escorts and to report shipping movements, could not attack surface units larger than destroyers until positively identified as hostile.  No ship attacks of any kind were authorized in heavy weather.  The lack of experience in combined surface, air, and sub-surface operations, combined with the inherent risk of damage by "friendly fire," concerned the Naval Staff planners and led them to prohibit surface attack against any submarine contact.(18)

 

On July 1, a German Condor bomber sighted PQ17 and reported its position, course, and speed.  Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft sighted the Home Fleet that evening and reported "three battleships and a carrier" steaming northeast of Iceland.  Hitler's first requirement had been met.  The Germans knew the location of the feared aircraft carrier.  The battle groups departed their anchorages late on the 2nd for a costly transit.  Luetzow grounded and sustained flooding damage which forced her to return to Germany for four months of repair.  Three destroyers foundered on the rocks of the treacherous Vestifiord.  Despite the losses, the plan proceeded.  The Naval Staff, however, refused to transmit the codeword, even though reconnaissance aircraft reported Victorious 300 miles southwest of the convoy, well out of operational range.  On Tirpitz, Admiral Schniewind was agitated by the lack of positive direction, and on his own initiative, he put to sea late on the 3rd for the next step in the operation, the move to Altenfiord.  Fearing the probability of German surface attacks, on the evening of July 4, the Admiralty issued orders to scatter the convoy and to withdraw the cruiser force.  The confusing Admiralty signals, caused the close escort commander to expect German warships on the horizon at any moment.  He withdrew his destroyers and joined the departing cruisers, leaving the scattered ships of PQ17 without substantial defenses.(19)

 

For the Germans, an element of doubt remained.  A patrol aircraft sighted the cruiser covering force late on the 3rd and erroneously reported it as a battleship (or heavy cruiser) and two light cruisers, implying the presence of Home Fleet forces in the vicinity of the convoy.(20)  The restriction concerning the aircraft carrier and location of Home Fleet remained overriding.(21)  In spite of his concerns, Raeder ordered the battle groups to get underway, when a report early on the 5th placed Home Fleet 800 miles from the attack zone and unlikely to be operating very far east due to the threat of land-based aircraft.(22)  At midday on the 5th, he issued the codeword.(23)  The operation came to naught, because British and Russian submarines had sighted and reported the battle force movements.  Raeder ordered his ships to return to port late on the 5th.

 

For the sailors of PQ17, nonetheless, the Arctic became a killing ground as air and submarine forces attacked the scattered merchantmen and sank twenty-three of the original thirty-five ships.(24)

 

Despite the overall success against PQ17, the recall of the surface sortie squandered Germany's best and ultimately last chance to employ the heavy surface units in a tactically advantageous engagement.

 

On December 30, 1942, the Admiral Hipper, Luetzow, and several destroyers sortied to intercept convoy JW51B in Operation "Regensbogen," which ended in failure and destroyed any remaining confidence in the heavy ships on the part of the Fuehrer.(25)  In the confused action, Luetzow completely missed the enemy ships passing astern of her while fleeing from Hipper.  The arrival of the British light cruisers, H.M.S. Jamaica and H.M.S. Sheffield, plus the stout resistance of the close escort, convinced the German commander, despite his superior firepower, to break off the engagement and retire to the west.  In his defense, he had received, just after departure, a signal modification to the standing operations order which held that a commander must avoid action with a superior enemy.  The modification read: "DISCRETION BE EXERCISED IN FACE OF ENEMY OF EQUAL STRENGTH OWING UNDESIRABILITY OF SUBMITTING CRUISERS TO MAJOR RISK."  The reminder of the standing order to avoid risk implied that he must take none.(26)

 

The retreat of the cruisers without inflicting serious damage enraged Hitler.  He ordered Raeder to scrap the heavy ships, asserting that the air and escort assets to protect them, compared to the dismal tactical results obtained to date, did not justify their continued use.  Their heavy guns could be used for coastal defense, and valuable metals, particularly steel, nickel, and copper, could be salvaged.(27)  Operation "Regensbogen" ended Raeder's career.

 

In his place came Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, the former commander of the submarine force.  Doenitz initially concurred with the plan to break up the heavy ships, but soon altered his stance.  The initial plan called for all heavy ships except four cruisers to be decommissioned by Autumn 1943, which would have made 250 officers, 8,000 petty officers and seamen, and 1,300 shipyard workers available for reassignment.(28)  Doenitz argued that the severe limitations placed on the previous operations had made them ineffective.  He asserted that the Arctic convoys made "excellent targets for large ships" and that not only should they be maintained, but that the Scharnhorst should be sent to Norway to form a more powerful raiding force.  Reluctantly, Hitler agreed to the plan and granted a six-month period for the heavy ships to prove their worth despite his opposition to "any further engagements of the surface ships because, beginning with the Graf Spee, one defeat has followed another."(29)

 

The fuel oil situation critically limited operational planning.  The early March 1942 raid had consumed 7,500 tons of fuel oil.  This rate mandated that in all future operations the target had to be clearly located and identified prior to surface raiders getting underway, a restriction difficult to meet in Arctic conditions.(30)  In fact, decreasing oil supplies had plagued the Naval Staff from the war's outset and by late 1941 had caused the reduction of the Navy's monthly allotment by 50 percent.  The delivery of 90,000 tons of fuel oil to the Italian Navy in January 1942 and the reluctance of Romanian producers to deliver oil except for payment in gold complicated the problem.(31)  Despite the limitations, by June 1942 Naval Group North's fuel oil situation had markedly improved and allowed for a "simultaneous attack by all naval units in northern waters."(32)  By late 1942, however, reserves again had fallen so low that fueling depots were "unable to keep sufficient supplies on hand," and bunkering large ships required advanced fuel stockpiling.(33)

 

Analysis of the effectiveness of the German surface naval strategy in the Arctic Theater produces two paradoxical conclusions.  On the one hand, through the temerity to risk heavy ships, the Germans lost opportunities to inflict debilitating damage on the Arctic convoys and their escorts.  Doenitz urged his subordinate commanders to conduct aggressive offensive actions, but few occurred.  On September 22, 1943, British midget submarines, called "X-Craft," launched a successful attack against Tirpitz at anchor in Trondheim and rendered her unavailable for the catastrophic final mission of Scharnhorst.(34)  Given the original conception of using heavy surface ships as commerce raiders to destroy convoys by overwhelming firepower and speed, the actual tactical results had proved a dismal failure.

 

On the other hand, by posing a consistent threat, German surface warships required the Allies to maintain sizeable forces in theater and thus unavailable for more productive employment elsewhere.  The suspension of the convoys after September 1942, except for winter sailings in periods of minimum daylight, was largely due to the implied threat of surface action, and, in effect, partially met German criteria for success.(35)

 

In the end, submarines and aircraft did cause significant Allied losses, but the third leg of the German strategic triad, the employment of heavy surface units, when compared to the expectations of early 1942, proved fragile and disappointing.

 

***

 

A former officer and currently a reserve officer in the US Navy, Stanley D. M. Carpenter is currently working toward his PhD in British History at Florida State University.  He regularly works as an adjunct professor at Tallahassee Community College.

 

 

ENDNOTES

 

1. A. J. Watts, The Loss of the Scharnhorst (London: Ian Allen, 1970), 51.

2. Samuel Eliot Morison, A History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), 165.

3. Charles S. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 188.  For an additional examination of the "double pole" strategy, see Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1939-1945 (Munich: Bernard and Graefe, 1970), 1: 65-66, 158-159, 514.

4. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), Apr. 13, 1942.  The Minutes of the Fuehrer Conferences were also translated and published in Brassey's Naval Annual (London: William Clowes, 1948).

5. Fuehrer Conferences, Dec. 29, 1941.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., Jan. 22, 1942.

8. Commander P. Q. Edwards, RN, was the officer in charge of the Admiralty's Director of Operations Division which initially planned the Arctic convoys.  This is where the "PQ" designation for eastbound convoys originated.  Westbound return convoys were called "QP."

9. S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. 2, The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 121.

10. Fuehrer Conferences, Mar. 12, 1942.

11. The Seeluftwaffe came under operational control of the Luftwaffe and flew Dornier Do18, Heinkel HE59, HE115, and HE119 sea and float planes for long-range reconnaissance and air/sea rescue.  The four-engine Focke Wulfe FW 200 Condor flew high-level bombing missions which proved remarkably successful against the slow-moving merchant ships.

12. Fuehrer Conferences, Apr. 13, 1942.  Work on the Graf Zeppelin, halted in April 1940, was resumed based on the March 16, 1942 order.  For details on the fate of the Graf Zeppelin see Erich Groener, German Warships 1815-1945, vol. 1: Major Surface Vessels (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 71-72.

13. Operational Order issued Mar. 14, 1942 through Naval Operations Branch of OKW Operations Staff.

14. Operatione und Taktik Heft, Aug. 1944.

15. The operational directive was the "Operative Weisung fur Einsatz der Dronthein-und Narvik-Gruppe gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug."  Admiral Schniewind issued the final operations order, "Operationsbefehl.  Einsatz der Flottenstreitkrafte im Nordraum gegen eines PQ-Geleitzug," on June 14, 1942.  The text of the Operations Order for the attack forms an appendix to Fuehrer Conferences, June 15, 1942.

16. Fuehrer Conferences, June 15, 1942.

17. Ibid.

18. Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung: War Diary, Operations Division, German Naval Staff, 1939-1945, Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives Branch, Washington, DC (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1984), microfilm, May 27, 1942.  The War Diary, along with numerous other military and naval records captured by Allied troops in 1945 at Schloss Tambach, are known as the Tambach Papers.  US Naval Intelligence translated the diaries, in which the German Naval Staff assess and summarize daily events and chronicled operational and administrative incidents and decisions.

19. Jack Broome, The Convoy Is to Scatter (London: William Kimber, 1972).  Captain Broome detailed the events which led to the confusion created by Admiralty signals and the scattering of PQ17.

20. War Diary, July 3, 1942.

21. Ibid., July 1-5, 1942.  The diaries clearly reflect the concern over the location of the Victorious and the Home Fleet.  Appropriately, Admiral Schmundt on July 4 ordered the submarines to make the Home Fleet covering force their primary target.

22. Ibid., July 5, 1942.

23. The codeword was actually a sentence which read:  "SECRET:  THE PRACTICE AMMUNITION PROVIDED AS PER NAVAL GROUP NORTH SECRET SIGNAL NO. 3756 IS WITHDRAWN."

24. Roskill, The War at Sea, 143.

25. After the embarrassment of PQ17, the Admiralty began designating convoys on a new system based on departure and arrival ports.  PQ18 in September 1942 was the last to use the now notorious designation system.

26. War Diary, Dec. 30, 31, 1942; Jan. 1, 1943; Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Naval War (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1974), 283.

27. Fuehrer Conferences, Jan. 6, 1943.

28. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1943.

29. Ibid., Feb. 26, 1943.

30. "Operationen von Flotten streitkraften in Nordpolarmeer in Jahre 1942," Operatione und Taktik Heft, Aug. 1944.

31. Fuehrer Conferences, Dec. 12, 1941.

32. Admiral Schniewind's analysis of the naval situation from "Operatione Verwendung der Flotten Streitkrafte im Nordraum," Fuehrer Conferences, May 30, 1942.

33. Fuehrer Conferences, Dec. 22, 1942.  Pocket battleships and submarines were not affected by the crisis as they operated on diesel rather than marine fuel oil.  Diesel fuel remained generally in good supply through the early war years.

34. The Naval Staff claimed that she fought to the last shell, no doubt based on the 6:24 pm signal (see n.1), and sank with ensign flying.  This heroic description cannot diminish the fact that with Scharnhorst's demise, the surface naval strategy had failed disastrously.  See War Diary, Dec. 22-27, 1943.

35. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, vol. 1: 365-66.  After the voyage of PQ-18, the "Trickle" movement for independent routing was tried in late Fall whereby two unescorted merchantmen were dispatched daily.

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